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BEING SURE AND BEING CONFIDENT  
THAT YOU WON’T LOSE CONFIDENCE 
Alexander R. PRUSS 
 
ABSTRACT: There is an important sense in which one can be sure without being 
certain, i.e., without assigning unit probability. I will offer an explication of this sense of 
sureness, connecting it with the level of credence that a rational agent would need to 
have to be confident that she won’t ever lose her confidence. A simple formal result 
then gives us an explicit formula connecting the threshold α for credence needed for 
confidence with the threshold needed for being sure: one needs 1−(1−α)
2
 to be sure. I 
then suggest that stepping between α and 1−(1−α)
2
 gives a procedure that generates an 
interesting hierarchy of credential thresholds.  
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1. Introduction 
There are some things I am sure of. I am sure I have two hands and that the world 
is billions of years old. Yet I assign a probability less than one to these 
propositions. There is some small chance that I am currently in the hospital after 
the amputation of one of my hands and am dreaming, and likewise there is some 
small chance that our best science is wrong about the age of the world. Being sure 
is not the same as being certain, in the technical sense of assigning probability 1.1 
(Throughout, I will use “certain” in this technical sense, though I suspect that the 
ordinary usage of “sure” and “certain” is quite close.) 
Perhaps the concept I am getting at is moral certainty? For instance, Leibniz 
writes:  
[N]o firm demonstration can be made from the success of hypotheses. Yet I shall 
not deny that the number of phenomena which are happily explained by a given 
hypothesis may be so great that it must be taken as morally certain.2  
                                                                
1 Or “super-1”, if we’re worried about cases like continuous processes where there are 
possibilities that have zero probability. 
2 G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans. and ed. L.E. Loemker (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 1989), 283. 
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Indeed, I suppose, my reasons for believing that the world is billions of 
years old have to do with “the success of hypotheses.” However “moral certainty” 
is something like certainty for all practical purposes. Leibniz expresses this by 
going on to say:  
Indeed, hypotheses of [this] kind are sufficient for everyday use.3  
And my sureness that the world is billions of years old is not just a credence 
sufficient for practical purposes. I might, after all, know that my belief that the 
world is billions of years old will never actually matter for any practical purposes. 
If sureness were a sufficiency for practical purposes, then in such a case it would 
be trivially true that I am sure, no matter what my credence was, which is absurd. 
Of course, for just about any proposition one can imagine a scenario where I 
end up betting for or against it. But sureness is not the same as a credence 
rationally sufficient for betting on the proposition in all imaginable circumstances, 
because no credence less than one would rationally suffice for such willingness, 
and it seems that we should allow for being sure with a credence less than one. 
The concept of being sure that I want to look for will be less pragmatic. I 
will offer an explication (in Carnap’s sense) of being sure in the next section, and 
then show how this explication offers a precise formula for how high one’s 
credence needs to be for sureness, in terms of how high one’s credence needs to be 
for confidence. 
2. Closure of Inquiry 
Being sure is stronger than just being confident. We could, of course, arbitrarily 
say that you’re confident if you assign a credence of at least 0.99 but sure if you 
assign a credence of at least 0.999, or one could do empirical research on the level 
of credence needed for people to claim confidence and sureness in any particular 
context. But it would be good to offer something more interestingly philosophical, 
to find something of philosophical significance close to what people mean when 
they talk of being sure. 
One difference between confidence and sureness that is not merely an 
arbitrary numerical distinction is that being sure will, in some sense, suffice for 
closure of inquiry.4 It won’t necessarily suffice practically for rational closure of 
inquiry. After all, no matter my being sure, as long as the probability is less than 
one, the payoffs in a betting scenario and the costs of inquiry might make it 
                                                                
3 Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 283. 
4 Compare the knowledge account in Kraig W. Martin, Justified Closure of Inquiry: A Non-
Reductive Account (PhD diss., Baylor University, 2014). 
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rational to continue inquiry – or I might just be paid to continue inquiry, no 
matter what I think. In such a case, although I continue the inquiry because it is 
practically rational to do so, I am not only confident that the proposition I am 
inquiring about is true, but I am also confident that the inquiry will not change 
my mind. Or at least will rationally not change my mind about the proposition, 
since the inquiry may be so dangerous that I have a high chance of a head-injury 
that causes a change of mind or I might be so irrationally stubborn that nothing 
would change my mind.5 
We shouldn’t understand sureness directly in terms of rational closure of 
inquiry. One might be irrationally sure in such a way that closure of inquiry 
would be quite irrational and, more controversially, one might even be rationally 
sure while realizing that closure of inquiry would be irrational. Rather, I want to 
suggest, to be sure is to have the level of credence that would be required for a 
certain kind of rational closure of inquiry. 
To get at what that level is, suppose I am a rational agent, I am certain of 
my future rationality, and I am confident of p. I also am certain that I will engage 
in a certain line of inquiry. Let L be the event that at the end of that line of 
inquiry I will not be confident in p. If the probability of L isn’t low enough that I 
be confident that future inquiry will make no difference to my confidence in p, 
then I am not in a position for rational closure of inquiry, epistemically speaking. 
And this is not a case where I am sure. I just do not have the kind of security in 
the face of future rational inquiry that being sure should offer. 
A necessary condition for being sure of p, then, is that if one is a rational 
agent certain of her future rationality, one is confident that future inquiries will 
not make one lose confidence in p. But whether one is sure should not depend on 
what future inquiries will actually take place or even what future inquiries are 
possible. It would be a sign of irrationality to say “I was sure of my hypothesis 
until I found a way to get funding to test it” on the grounds that once one found a 
way to get funding to test the hypothesis, then one was no longer confident that 
one wouldn’t lose confidence in the hypothesis. Of course one may well feel less 
sure when the possibility of being proved wrong looms larger, but (a) this is a sign 
of irrationality akin to being scared to fly even in cases where one knows it’s safer 
than driving to the airport was, and (b) to feel sure or unsure is not the same as to 
be sure or unsure. 
                                                                
5 I’m grateful to an interlocutor whose identity has slipped from my memory for the latter 
suggestion. 
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Thus, a necessary condition for a perfectly rational agent being sure of p is 
that she have a level of credence that would suffice for being confident that one 
rationally won’t lose confidence given hypothetical future inquiries. 
I now make a crucial posit. Whether one is sure and whether one is 
confident depend only on the probability one assigns to a proposition. If I have a 
higher credence for p than you have for q, and you are sure or confident of q, then 
I am respectively sure or confident of p. (There may, however, be contextual 
variability as to what the standards for the thresholds are, and so the previous 
sentence will only be true when these are held constant. See Section 4.) Insofar as 
our ordinary usage of “is sure” is to some degree infected with how sure one feels, 
this won’t match ordinary usage, and so what I am providing is an explication, in 
Carnap’s sense, rather than an analysis. 
The posit lets us leverage data about when a perfectly rational agent is 
confident to get insight on when an imperfect agent is sure: the imperfect agent is 
sure when her credence is sufficiently high that a perfectly rational agent with 
that credence would be sure. Putting together the above considerations, we can 
now give a necessary condition for any agent to be sure. An agent is sure of p only 
if she assigns a credence r to p such that r satisfies the Rational Confidence in 
Continued Confidence condition:  
(RCCC) Necessarily any perfectly rational agent who knows she will remain 
perfectly rational and who assigns a credence r to some proposition q is 
confident that she will remain confident in q. 
This condition constrains the credence needed for being sure in terms of the 
credence needed for being confident. And of course in a standard Bayesian setting, 
r=1 will satisfy RCCC, no matter what the threshold for confidence is. 
My main proposal now is to suppose the necessary condition to be sufficient 
in order to arrive at an explication of being sure:  
(SURE) An agent is sure of p if and only if the credence r she assigns to p 
satisfies RCCC. 
On this proposal, being sure is related to a kind of security from rational 
refutation. One is sure provided that one has sufficient credence that any rational 
being who is certain of her future rationality is confident in her continued 
confidence, and hence is in a position to epistemically close inquiry. Of course, 
one might be sure and yet expect that future inquiry would shake one’s own 
confidence, but that would be a sign that one isn’t a rational being who is certain 
of her future rationality. 
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One might think that something stronger should be required, namely that 
to be sure, a rational agent who is certain of future rationality must be sure that 
she won’t stop being sure. But that’s too strong a condition if we are to leave open 
the possibility of being sure while assigning credence less than one, since 
credences do indeed vacillate, and so an agent slightly above the threshold of 
being sure – as long as that threshold falls short of one – cannot be confident, 
much less sure, that her credence won’t dip slightly below that threshold. SURE 
allows the rational agent not to be confident that she will remain sure, but only 
requires that she be confident that her credence won’t dip below the lower 
threshold, that of confidence. 
It is a not entirely trivial question, however, whether any credence level 
r<1 suffices for satisfying RCCC. If it turns out that the answer to this question is 
negative, a consequence of SURE – and even of the claim that RCCC provides a 
necessary condition for being sure – will be that one can’t be sure without being 
certain, i.e., without assigning credence 1. In the next section I explore the 
question of what constraint RCCC places on r. 
3. Being Sure 
In the Appendix, I will show that the following is a consequence of a Bayesian 
agent’s credential dynamics being a martingale. 
Proposition 1 Suppose α and r are strictly between 0 and 1. A rational Bayesian 
agent who assigns P(p)=r and is certain that she will always update in a 
Bayesian way assigns a probability of at least 1−(1−r)/(1−α) that her 
credence assignment in p will always remain at or above the level α.  
Simple algebraic manipulation then shows: 
Corollary 1 Suppose 0<α<1. If a rational Bayesian agent assigns a probability 
P(p)≥1−(1−α)
2
 to p, then she assigns a probability of at least α that her 
credence assignment in p will always remain at or above α.  
Taking α to be the level of credence needed for confidence, we see that a 
credence r satisfies RCCC if r≥1−(1−α)2, where α is the credence threshold needed 
for confidence.6 Consequently, we now know that SURE is not too rigorous to be 
satisfied at a credence level less than unity, and we have a sufficient condition for 
being sure. 
                                                                
6 I assume the threshold for confidence is a number such that confidence requires a credence 
greater than or equal than the threshold. I leave the modifications of my story for the case 
where the credence must be strictly greater than the threshold to the reader. 
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Next observe that the inequality in the Corollary is sharp. For let β=P(p) and 
suppose that β<1−(1−α)2. Assume α≤β (otherwise, we don’t even start at the 
confidence level α.) Next suppose that the line of inquiry that the agent expects to 
undertake is this. Another agent who knows for certain whether p is true flips a 
loaded coin with probability γ of heads out of sight of the agent and 
independently of p. (We will specify γ soon.) The agent then discloses the truth 
value of the disjunction p&h, where h is the proposition that the coin came out 
heads. Note that P(p|p&h)=1 and, due to the independence of p and h,  
(1)  P(p|~(p&h)) = P(p&~h)/P(~(p&h)) = β(1−γ)/(1−βγ) . 
Now we specify that γ=α/(1−(1−α)2). (It’s easy to check that γ is strictly 
between 0 and 1 if α is.) The probability that p&h will be disclosed as false is  
1−βγ = 1− βα/(1−(1−α)
2
) > 1−α, 
since we assumed that β < 1−(1−α)2. Now γ < α/β by the same assumption. Thus if 
p&h disclosed as false, the credence in p will fall below α, because of (1) and since  
 β(1−γ)/(1−βγ) = 1− (1−β)/(1−βγ)  
 < 1− (1−β)/(1−β(α/β)) 
 = 1− (1−β)/(1−α) 
 < 1− [1−(1−(1−α)
2
)]/(1−α) = α. 
Thus, for any credence below 1−(1−α)
2
, we can find a case where starting 
with that credence we have a probability less than α that the credence will remain 
at or above α. And that case can be one of perfect rationality. 
This sharpness shows that the inequality r≥1−(1−α)
2
 is not only sufficient 
for RCCC, but is necessary for it. Thus it follows from SURE that:  
(FORMULA) An agent is sure of p if and only if she assigns a credence r to p such 
that r≥1−(1−α)
2
, where α is the credential threshold for confidence. 
Thus, if confidence requires a credence of 0.99, then being sure requires 
1−(1−0.99)2=0.9999. If confidence requires 0.9999, then being sure calls for 
0.99999999. 
4 Closing Remarks 
On this account, to be sure is to have a degree of credence sufficient to ensure that 
one can be confident that one won’t lose confidence given further rational 
inquiry. If one’s credence is rational, then in such a case, it is not merely 
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pragmatically but epistemically appropriate to close further rational inquiry, as 
one is confident that it would be rationally pointless. Our results give us a formula 
for what this threshold of credence must be, namely 1−(1−α)2 where α is what is 
needed for confidence. 
It is surprising that there is such an exact formula for when one counts as 
sure. Two things should alleviate this surprise. The first is that we are explicating 
rather than analysing. There is a natural concept, that of rational confidence in 
one’s continued confidence, that is in the vicinity of our ordinary concept of being 
sure, and it is this concept that gives rise to the formula. The second thing to 
remember is that what counts as confidence is vague. So we have a precise formula 
that relates being sure to being confident, but being confident is something that is 
far from precise. The vagueness in being confident then transfers precisely to the 
vagueness in being sure. 
Furthermore, it is very likely that what counts as being confident depends 
on contextual standards. On the above story, the standard for being sure follows in 
lockstep the contextual standard for being confident. In contexts where 
confidence is 0.9, being sure is 0.99, while in contexts where confidence is 0.999, 
being sure is 0.999999. Nonetheless, there is one interesting difficulty. Our 
formula above assumed that when we talk of confidence that one won’t lose 
confidence, the same standard of confidence applies at both points. But it might be 
that the contextual standards of confidence for a first order claim p are different 
from those for the second order claim that one won’t rationally lose that 
confidence in p. If so, then our formula becomes more complicated, and we leave 
it as an exercise to the reader to derive that formula from Proposition 1 and an 
analogue to the reasoning in the sharpness argument. 
One might attempt to extend our hierarchy. If α is the level for confidence, 
and 1−(1−α)
2
 is the threshold for being sure, one might think that a value γ such 
that 1−(1−γ)2=α (i.e., γ=1−√(1−α)) is the threshold for belief. Thus, one is 
confident provided that one has a credence that would suffice for rationally 
believing in continued belief. And so we have a three-fold hierarchy: belief, 
confidence and sureness. If confidence is at 0.99, then sureness will be at 0.9999 
while belief will be at 0.9. 
There is also some plausibility in rejecting the above as an account of the 
relationship between being sure and being confident, while accepting it as an 
account of the relationship between being confident and simply believing. 
The above hierarchy might be extended in both an upward and a 
downward direction, producing a natural hierarchy of level of credence αn such 




. For instance, we might have something like “seeing as likely” 
below belief, and above sureness we might have “super-sureness” at 0.99999999. 
At each level, the rational agent who is certain of continued rationality will have 
the next lower level of credence in not falling below that level. 
The hierarchy might give us a way of directly identifying a particular 
natural sequence of thresholds, since it is natural to start at 1/2. Then the sequence 
of thresholds will be approximately: 0.5, 0.75, 0.9375, 0.9961, 0.99998, 
0.9999999998, … If we wanted to, we could then think of 0.75 as the threshold for 
seeing as likely (Windschitl and Wells find “likely” to fit with 0.75 in their 
experiments7), 0.9375 for belief, 0.9961 for confidence, 0.99998 for being sure in 
the ordinary way, and 0.9999999998 for being super-sure. But rather than trying 
to exactly fit the numbers to ordinary language, it may be more helpful to simply 
recognize a natural hierarchy of levels of confidence determined by principled 
considerations. 
In any case, intuitively, a credential difference of the sort we find between 
α and 1−(1−α)
2
 marks an important difference. How exactly one matches up the 
hierarchy with ordinary predicates like “believes,” “is sure” and “is confident” may 
be less important than recognizing the kind of steps that are found in the 
hierarchy. Note that if evidential strength or degree of confirmation offered by 
evidence E to a hypothesis H is measured by the log-likelihood ratio 
log P(E|H)/P(E|~H), as has been contended by Good8 (1984; see also the defense in 
Pruss 2014), then it is easy to check that if a hypothesis starts at probability 1/2, 
each successive level of the hierarchy would require approximately double the 
degree of confirmation relative to the start that the previous did, and that does 
seem to be an intuitively important step. 
Appendix: Argument for Proposition 1 
Think of a Bayesian agent’s credences at the start of the data-gathering process as a 
countably-additive probability P on a probability space <Ω, F>, so that events are 
members of the σ-field F of subsets of Ω. We now want to model the evolution of 
the agent’s credences for a non-empty event H∈F. 
                                                                
7 Paul D. Windschitl and Gary Wells, “Measuring Psychological Uncertainty: Verbal Versus 
Numeric Methods,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 2 (1996): 343–364. 
8 I. J. Good, “The Best Explicatum for Weight of Evidence,” Journal of Statistical Computation 
and Simulation 19 (1984): 294–299. For a recent defense, see Alexander R. Pruss, “Independent 
Tests and the Log-Likelihood-Ratio Measure of Confirmation,” Thought 3 (2014): 124–135. 
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The agent’s gathering of more and more data can be modeled as a sequence 
of finer and finer σ-fields F0  F1  F2  …, where F0 is the trivial σ-field {, Ω}. 
For instance, suppose that at step n, the agent learns whether some relevant piece 
of evidence En obtains. Then Fn is the smallest σ-field generated by the set of 
events {E1,…,En}. Of course, the data-gathering process can be much more 
complex. For instance, at step n, the agent might learn the value of some real- or 
vector-valued random variable Yn, rather than just the answer to a yes-or-no 
question as in the case where the agent learns whether En obtains. In that case, Fn 
is the σ-field generated by the variables {Y1,…,Yn}. Additional complexity can be 
modeled. For instance, what experiment the agent does at step n might depend on 
the information obtained in steps 1,…,n. 
The important thing here is that the agent gets more and more information 
as the process continues, which is modeled by the fact that the σ-fields get finer 
and finer. 
If ω is the agent’s actual (but unknown to the agent) position in the state 
space Ω, then the function taking ω to an agent’s credence in H at step n in the 
data-gathering process where the agent is at ω is equal to (a version of9) P(H| Fn), 
where as usual a conditional probability P(A|G) with respect to a σ-field G is a G-
measurable function on Ω such that the conditional expectation of P(A|G) with 
respect to any non-null event B∈G equals P(A|B).10 If the field Fn is finite (i.e., 
only a finite amount of information is received by step n) and its non-empty 
members have non-zero probability, then P(H|Fn)(ω) equals P(H|B) where B is the 
smallest member of Fn containing ω. This models the fact that what an agent at ω 
by step n has found out is that her position in the state space is a member of B, and 
being a good Bayesian, her credence in H is of course P(H|B). 
Let Xn be the agent’s credence at step n. This will be a random variable 
equal to (a version of) P(H|Fn), and the sequence X1,X2,… will be a martingale.
11 
Then Xn(ω) is the agent’s credence at step n. In particular X0(ω) is constant and 
equal to r (we are given that the agent’s initial credence is r). Fix any natural 
                                                                
9 Conditional probabilities with respect to a σ-field are normally defined only up to sets of 
measure zero. 
10 For background, see Kai Lai Chung, A Course in Probability Theory (San Diego: Harcourt, 
2001). 
11 Cf. Simon M. Hutteger, “Learning Experiences and the Value of Knowledge,” Philosophical 
Studies 171 (2014): 279-288. 
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number N and let τN(ω) be equal to N if for all n≤N we have Xn(ω)≥α; otherwise, 
let τN(ω) be the smallest value of n such that Xn(ω)<α. This is a stopping time: a 
natural-number-valued function such that the event {ω : τN(ω)=n} is measurable 
with respect to Fn for each n. Define the random variable ZN by setting 
ZN(ω)=XτN(ω)(ω). This random variable represents the first credence up to time N 
to drop below α, if there is a credence that drops below α in that time period, and 
if there isn’t, it’s just the credence at time N. 
By Doob’s Optional Sampling Theorem,12 E(ZN)=E(X0). But E(X0)=r. Let 
AN={ω : n (n≤N & Xn<α)} be the event of the credence dropping below α by time 
N. Then E(ZN) ≤ P(AN)α+(1−P(AN)), since on AN the value of ZN is less than α 
while outside AN (indeed, everywhere) the value of ZN is at most 1. Thus  
r = E(ZN) ≤ P(AN)α+(1−P(AN)) = 1−(1−α)P(AN), 
and so (1−r)/(1−α)≥P(AN). 
Observe that A1  A2  … (i.e., if we dip below α by time N, we certainly 
do so by time N+1). Let A be the union of all the events AN. Now, the agent’s 
credence dips below α at some time or other precisely on the event A, and by 
countable additivity P(A)=lim N→∞P(AN) since the sets AN are increasing with N. 
Since P(AN)≤(1−r)/(1−α), it follows that the probability that the agent’s credence 
ever dips below α is at most (1−r)/(1−α), from which the conclusion of 
Proposition 1 immediately follows. 
                                                                
12 Chung, A Course in Probability Theory, Section 9.3. 
